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An unusual feature of this case was the long duration of the "quarantine
phase". This is explained by the fact that Mad Cow disease was a new
disease. As such, virtually nothing was known about it. There was little
specific scientific knowledge on which to base informed decisions. Consequently,
as new intelligence on the disease became available, the uncertainty associated
with this phase was gradually removed.
By contrast, the 2001 outbreak of “Foot and Mouth” disease (FMD) in cattle
that also occurred in the UK had a well-known body of science on which to base
decisions. Thus, in the FMD case, the “quarantine phase” associated with
uncertainty was much shorter. Within a year after the first FMD case was
diagnosed, the UK was declared officially FMD-free. The cost to the British
economy (tourism and farming) was over $10 billion. For links to FMD chronology
of events, policy decisions and lessons learned, visit:
www.executive.org/FMD
2. Lessons Learned
The following lessons may be noted from the Mad-Cow experience in the UK.
Some are drawn from this book, some from Lord Justice Phillips’ inquiry report
on BSE, and others from personal experience in dealing with surprise events.
1. Focus on leading. Neither the crisis nor the long term developments can
wait. Both must be addressed simultaneously. At least one senior leader must
devote all her/his attention to managing the crisis. That person must
dramatically prune her/his remaining workload and promptly delegate what can be
done by others.
2. Scan the Environment regularly. Scan the whole value chain, in this
case from the farm to the consumer table. Focus on high-risk issues. Build, an
informal early warning system with the help of sister organizations and other
global allies. Train everyone to collect and submit intelligence. Validate data.
Prepare a weekly roll-up of information to be shared upwards and downwards in
the organization.
3. Anticipate possible surprise events. In Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC),
we frequently run simulated models of disease outbreaks.
4. Communicate with experts and policy makers. In AAFC, we held "High
Visibility Meetings" twice daily in the early phases of dealing with a surprise
event, and as required thereafter. For example, in the Canadian context, a
surprise event involving a serious animal disease would bring together
representatives from:
– The Privy Council Office for government-wide coordination,
– Health Canada (Department of Health),
– Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) including the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency,
the Minister’s and Deputy Minister’s offices, legal and field
staff,
– The Department of Finance to explore compensation (for animals
slaughtered),
– The Treasury Board,
– The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (international
impact),
– The Department of Justice (for quick passage of new regulations), and
– Provincial governments and other organizations, as required.
5. Foster transparency. Communicate with other stakeholders and the public
at large. Base public statements on evidence. Act as a single government, not as a
collection of independent departments. Citizens don’t care about government’s internal
structure. This is especially true in the food chain. Provide regular public
briefings with written support material (Lord Phillip’s Inquiry)
v].
6. Be particularly careful to brief issue riders. Attempt to ethically move
stakeholders along the Factional Scale™ from "foes" towards
"friends" by listening and addressing the questions and concerns within your
domain (see Chapter 10).
7. Avoid absolute statements such as “there is no conceivable risk of BSE
being transmitted from cows to people.” In the early stages, put emphasis on
collecting evidence and facts. Information is incomplete in the early phases of
a surprise event. It is important to be able to confront opinion with facts.
8. Be candid with the media. Misleading the media and the public is unethical and
irresponsible. In this case, the Phillips’ inquiry tells us the "government did not
lie to the public about BSE. It believed that the risk was remote". But, the public
felt betrayed when, in March 1996, the Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (CJD) Surveillance Unit
declared that the "most likely explanation for vCJD]" was "exposure to
BSE."
9. Value prompt decision-making. Disease can spread geographically with great
rapidity; thus a short, fast decision cycle is of paramount importance. In
overlapping legal jurisdictions, federal, state, or provincial controls must be
synchronized. Act on the suspicion of disease. Protecting human health is the
first priority. Control the spread first; fight adversity afterwards. The
alternative can be much worse. Armed with comprehensive intelligence about the
causes and the stakeholders, AAFC has produced new regulations in a day in a
crisis situation.
10. Proceed with caution. Based on Maslow hierarchy of needs, health and safety
are fundamental human priorities. The precautionary principle should be used where a
serious animal or human disease is suspected. This principle has been used since
biblical times in disease control, e.g., the principle of quarantining suspected
disease carriers.
11. Marshall adequate resources. Draw, if necessary, on all the country’s
resources to deal with a national crisis. Call on universities, contract
employees, retired professionals and resources from other agencies and
governments.
12. Consider the benefits and costs of advisory bodies. Consultative boards
provide access to knowledge, a different point of view, a sense of public
participation, and create a perception of openness to public participation.
However, they may slow decision-making, as observed in Lord Phillips’ Inquiry
Report. In addition, rejecting the advice of an advisory body can lead to a
serious loss of credibility.
13. Adjudicate competing priorities. The customer comes first! For
government, the citizen is the customer. A farming crisis is a serious economic
crisis. A food-safety crisis is a matter of grave concern. Both issues must be
addressed. But, human health must be given priority over farm economics.
14. Reach out to credible authorities worldwide. Be careful not to be
contradicted by an authoritative body. Although both the UK and EU ruled on BSE,
the EU can be seen as more credible if considered to be less captive to local or
special interests.
i]
U.S. Food and Drug Administration: BSE Contingency Plan, Version 1.0 –
February 15, 2001
quoting J.W. Wilesmith et al.: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:
Epidemiologic Features 1985 to 1990. Veterinary Record 130:90-94. 1992.
www.fda.gov/oc/bse/contingency.html#background
ii]
New Scientist: Timeline: The Rise and Rise of BSE, undated.
Consulted August 25, 2002.
www.newscientist.com/hottopics/bse/bsetimeline.jsp
iii]
John Darnton: The Logic of the "Mad Cow" Scare, The New York Times,
March 30, 1996.
www.mad-cow.org/96mar.html
iv]
Reuters Newsmedia.
www.ita.suite.dk/alreuter.htm
v]
BBC News: BSE Report: The Main Points, BBC, October 26, 2000.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/992435.stm
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français
Isolated event phase: Several isolated events form the embryo of the issue
in Great Britain. Citing J.W. Wilesmith, the FDA states that there are indications
that the first clinical case of the disease was observed as early as April 1985.
